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Abstract: Tax design is said to be based on certain principles comprising efficiency of resource 
allocation despite taxation’s distortionary effects, maintenance or encouragement of equity 
among taxpayers, and assisting in macro-economic stabilisation. Other safeguards are a tax 
system’s revenue productivity, clarity of taxation law, ease of tax compliance, and facilitation of 
tax administration. Common experience reveals, however, that no tax structure complies with 
these criteria all at once, for the principles tend to conflict with one another.  
The term reform is variously used by authors and across tax professions—economists, 
legal experts, accountants, administrators—their emphasis varying significantly. Bridging these 
gaps remains a crucial challenge. Empirical evidence also suggests that when a new 
administration takes over, it puts its own stamp on tax policy, egged on by lobbyists who were 
adversely affected in earlier change cycles. And, with the internationalisation of taxation, a 
country’s tax structure gets affected by developments in political or trading blocs.  
With this background, this paper points towards vacillations and drifts in the way tax 
changes occur. Consumption taxes (VAT/GST), production taxes such as excises, environment 
taxes, and user charges, as well as direct taxes including income and wealth taxes, and their 
component taxes on dividends, capital gains, cash-flow, presumptive bases, minimum tax 
payments, and emerging factors in international taxation, are taken up. 
In conclusion, the effects of taxes go beyond narrow economic aspects. Legal, accountancy 
or administrative aspects carry important implications. The glass wall between tax economics 
and tax law or accountancy, and between tax economics and tax administration, if removed, 
would generate an awareness with beneficial crossover effects. Then tax reform can be discussed 
on the same plane and be implemented with comparable understandings.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Tax design should have theoretical underpinnings in the form of principles of 
taxation comprising efficiency of resource allocation despite taxation’s distortionary 
effects, its ramifications on inequity, and its potential in economic stabilisation. 
Nevertheless it should bear in mind broader perspectives of revenue productivity, 
clarity of taxation law, ease of tax compliance, and facilitation of tax administration1. 
Most of these principles are well-known but they become important or recede to 
insignificance with the vagaries of time or of particular situations. 
When economies function well, equity is of less concern. But when the 
economy is foundering, progressivity in taxation protects the less well-off. 
Progressive tax rates also stabilise the economy from unwanted or unexpected 
fluctuations. Blanchard et al2  brought together a collection of papers at a 
conference at the IMF that comprehensively discussed crisis and post-crisis policies 
to stabilise fluctuations. Roxan3 and others have, in this context, pointed towards 
the limits of globalisation and their ramifications for taxation.  
Another aspect of tax design that is crucial is how a tax affects the efficiency of 
resource allocation by attempting to minimise tax incentives that distort relative 
prices across sectors and result in erroneous signals for production—away from 
consumer preferences. A seminal early treatise on the distortions and deadweight 
loss of taxation itself was by Harberger4.  
Apart from those three principles, any country authority would be interested in 
additional characteristics in a tax system. For example, a buoyant tax structure that 
has a built-in ability to be revenue productive during both affluent years through 
the income tax and during deflation through a VAT or GST is warranted5. Further, 
despite good intentions of the tax designers, if the tax law is cumbersome and hard 
of interpretation, the tax system loses its sharpness and ends in litigation and, the 
worse is the law, the longer is the litigation process likely to be6. Thus, simplicity 
and the associated ease of taxpayer compliance have increasingly come to be 
recognised as an important tenet of tax design, the “ease of paying taxes” being 
included as a component of the World Bank’s cross-country “ease of doing 
                                                      
1 Baker, Philip and Piston, Pasquale. 2015. ‘The Practical Protection of Taxpayers’ Fundamental Rights,’ 
General Report, International Fiscal Association, 2015 Basel Congress, Volume 100B; Shome, Parthasarathi. 
2014. Taxation Principles and Applications: A Compendium, Lexis Nexis, New Delhi. See various chapters on 
VAT and GST in an international context, Section I.2. 
2 Blanchard, Olivier J., David Romer, Michael Spence, and Joseph E. Stiglitz ed. 2011. In the Wake of the 
Crisis: Leading Economists Reassess Economic Policy, International Monetary Fund, M.I.T Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. 
3 Roxan, Ian. 2012. ‘Limits to globalisation: some implications for taxation, tax policy, and the developing 
world,’ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Paper Series, 3/2012, Law Department, London School 
of Economics and Political Science, London, UK. 
4 Harberger, Arnold C. 1974. Taxation and Welfare, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. See also Shome. 
2014. Section III. 
5 Shome. 2014. Section I.3. 
6 Butani, Mukesh. 2016. Tax Dispute Resolution – Challenges and Opportunities for India [Derived from Challenges 
of Indian Tax Administration], LexisNexis, New Delhi. 
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business” index7. Last, and perhaps most important, are a tax administration’s 
transparency, incorruptibility and impartial application of the law even as 
subordinate legislation or administrative rules that override legislative intent are 
minimised8. 
 
 
 
2. CONFLICTS AMONG PRINCIPLES 
 
It is not uncommon for various principles and objectives to conflict with one 
another with the outcome of reform becoming undecipherable or anomalous. An 
inefficient tax that can raise revenue in the short run could impinge upon economic 
growth and thus lead to revenue stagnation in the medium term. Indulgence in 
taxing capital gains appropriately would lead to inequity across income sources; yet 
adverse tax treatment of capital income could slow down capital accumulation and 
economic growth. It is this fear that had led to a long period of accommodation to 
the taxation of returns to capital of multi-national companies (MNCs). A collection 
of legal experts, economists and tax administrators has considered a list of related 
issues in Shome9. The flip side perception of tax administrations is that MNCs 
organise their tax matters to minimise tax payments globally through complex tax 
avoidance—separated from tax evasion—leading, in the extreme case, for some tax 
administrations to attempt to stem it through retrospective taxation. Of course, a 
well-worn method to stem both sides of the problem—tax depletion and double 
taxation—has been the painstakingly slow approach of double taxation avoidance 
agreements (DTAAs), a recent evolution and analysis having been carried out by 
Baistrocchi10.   
An investor can use a business model that would guide him to decide how 
much investment he should make in a given risky environment. This of course 
would be determined by the extent of his aversion, neutrality or preference towards 
risk. Uncertainty removes the possibility for existence of such a dependable business 
model. The investor makes a decision to invest reflecting, from his standpoint, a 
known tax risk that reflects his attitude towards risk. If, however, say after five years 
of his investment decision, the government declares that the tax law has been now 
changed from five years prior to the present day, the basis of that investment 
crumbles. It is as if informing him today in time t that the law in time t-5 was actually 
quite different from what had been written down as law in t-5. This manner of 
                                                      
7 World Bank. 2016. Doing Business - 2017: Equal Opportunity for All, 25th October. 
8 Shome, Parthasarathi. 2015. Tax Administration Reform in India: Spirit, Purpose and Empowerment (Volume 4), 
Report of the Tax Administration Reform Commission (TARC), Ministry of Finance, Government of 
India, New Delhi. 
9 Shome, Parthasarathi ed. 2016. Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS): The Global Taxation Agenda, 
International Tax Research and Analysis Foundation (ITRAF), Wolters Kluwer, New Delhi. 
10 Baistrocchi, Eduardo ed. 2017.  A Global Analysis of Tax Treaty Disputes, Cambridge University Press, 
London. 
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retrospectivity in taxation becomes untenable for business decision making. Yet 
certain tax jurisdictions have tended to use this unjustifiable legal device with the 
objective of capturing revenue already lost through legal interpretation of the law. 
MNCs have explicably complained that retrospective legislation leads to an 
uncertain—as opposed to merely risky—environment thus leading them to scale 
back investments from such jurisdictions. Reflecting the high mobility of 
international capital, such withdrawal can be brisk. Lower investment leads to lower 
growth and, therefore, to lower tax revenue collection. And the deleterious growth 
effects of taxation could be near permanent, rather than merely transitory.11 
 
 
 
3. DOES TAX REFORM LAST 
 
How often, how far, and across what expanse of geographical reach can tax reform 
be said to have achieved success? Relatively little. Why? First, the term itself is 
variously used by authors, for example, Bernardi, Fraschini and Shome, Chen and 
Mintz, Focanti et al, Gimenez and Rodriguez, Alm et al, or Ruiz et al12 to name a 
few. Second, the concept of tax reform varies across tax professions. Economists 
tend to emphasise the efficiency criterion, remaining critical of a structure that has 
too many tax incentives. Some economists believe that achieving equity using 
expenditure policies is superior to a structure that uses taxation. Legal experts tend 
to focus on the sharpness or clarity of a law and, if not, they take as a worthy 
challenge, intelligent interpretation of the law, to be resolved by the judiciary. And 
a tax administrator’s best tax structure is the most revenue productive. It is almost 
as if there is a glass wall between the tax economist and the legal expert and, again, 
between the tax economist and the tax administrator. Differences between a legal 
expert and a tax administrator in the interpretation of the law also emerge, reflecting 
fundamental differences in professional perceptions. Bridging these perceptible 
gaps perhaps remains a crucial challenge to the larger taxation profession13.  
                                                      
11 And whether tax payments by MNCs on the whole—as opposed to a few service oriented ones that were 
difficult to be pinned down regarding the existence of their permanent establishments in any tax 
jurisdiction—have been low in terms of their profits has been questioned by some including Shome ed. 
2016. in the context, specifically, of India. 
12 Bernardi, L., Fraschini, A. and Shome, P. ed. 2006. Tax Systems and Tax Reforms in South and East Asia, 
Routledge, Oxford; Mintz, Jack and Chen, Duanjie. 2011. ‘Federal-Provincial Business Tax Reforms: A 
Growth Agenda with Competitive Rates and a Neutral Treatment of Business Activities,’ SPP Research 
Papers, The School of Public Policy, University of Calgary, Vol 4(1); Focanti, Diego, Hallerberg, Mark, and 
Scartascini, Carlos. 2013. Tax Reforms in Latin America in an Era of Democracy, IDB Working Paper Series, 
No. IDB-WP-457; Gimenez, EL and Rodriguez, M. 2016. ‘Optimality of relaxing revenue-neutral 
restrictions in green tax reforms’, Governance and Economics Research Network (GEN), GEN Working Paper A 
2016 – 5; Alm, James, Sheffrin, Steven M. 2016. ‘What Drives State Tax Reforms?’, Public Finance Review, 
Vol 45(4), pp: 443-457; Ruiz, SVl, Peralta-Alva, A. and Puy, D. 2017. Macroecoenomic and Distributional 
Effects of Personal Income Tax Reforms: A Heterogenous Agent Model Approach for the US, IMF 
Working Paper, WP/17/192. 
13 Shome, Parthasarathi ed. 2013. Indian Tax Administration: A Dialogue, Orient Blackswan, New Delhi.  
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Even if it is argued that those differences are not terribly important, a source 
of the ephemeral nature of tax reform emerges from empirical evidence which 
suggests that, after about five years of undertaking reform, country authorities face 
new challenges to the edifice that begins to crack. First, those who are adversely 
affected, even if marginally, begin to lobby, often steadily and strongly, for 
reinstatement of their privileges, usually for sector specific tax incentives, tax 
holidays, accelerated depreciation, lowered VAT rates for individual commodity 
classifications and so on. Thus, those who complain rightly about the adverse effects 
on them of retrospective taxation, now take on the role of the hungry bird as soon 
as the situation permits.  
Second, in most democracies there is likely to be a change in government in 
four, five or six years; and the new administration likes to put its own stamp on 
public policy including, or in particular, tax policy. Relatedly, third, the term ‘tax 
reform’ probably possesses the worst interpretation of the second word in modern 
professional usage. Any change is termed reform and successive governments 
attempt to rapidly change what their predecessors have done. Thus, by a mere check 
of definition or consistency, these changes can hardly be called reform. In fact, there 
is constant justification made for ‘change’ for which tax administrations have tended 
to set up full and comprehensive departments, rendering a rather amusing 
interpretation that tax policy or tax administration reform may never achieve a stable 
equilibrium. 
And last but not least, fourth, with the ever longer global reach and 
internationalisation of taxation, a country’s tax structure gets affected by multilateral 
movements in international taxation as well as by changes in political or trading 
blocs. Thus the life of a global trend in tax reform can be cut short through blowing 
international winds that fail to adhere to modern tenets of taxation.  
 
 
 
4. TAX STRUCTURE 
 
i. WHY TAX EXPENDITURE AS WELL AS INCOME 
 
An economy’s overall supply equals its demand after accommodating for its exports 
and imports. The supply of output may be expressed as the incomes the production 
generates comprising the economy’s wage income, capital income, and land income. 
Using the incomes, economic agents make demands in the market for 
consumption and investment by both individuals and the public sector. This supply-
demand mirror image is usually referred to as the national income identity.14  
The question to ponder is, if both sides are essentially the same thing, what is 
the rationale, need or justification for taxing both the demand and supply side of 
                                                      
14 See Lipsey, Richard and Steiner, Peter. 1975. Economics, Harper and Brothers, New York; and Dernburg, 
Thomas F. 1960. Macroeconomics, McGraw-Hill, New York, for early expositions. 
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the same economy? Would not the tax structure be simpler if only the demand or 
the supply side were taxed.15  Indeed, as a country develops and its tax system 
becomes more mature, it becomes apparent that its overall tax structure also 
becomes more complex. Is there no reprieve from this?  
There are reasons for this “double” taxation, however, for there are pros and 
cons associated with taxing consumption as well as income. Among the advantages 
of consumption taxation such as with a VAT or GST, the first is the exemption of 
savings. By contrast, investment could be visualised as being taxed under the income 
tax, once as income and, second, on the returns from income. Second, a 
consumption tax could be designed with progressive elements. Its disadvantages 
comprise, first, its perception as a payroll tax from a lifetime perspective excluding 
bequests and inheritances and, therefore, causing undue burdens on wage earners. 
Second, income tax relies on the comprehensive Haig-Simons definition of income 
as accretion of power to consume and, therefore, the proper basis for equity in 
taxation. Nevertheless, many developing countries depend heavily on the VAT as a 
revenue earner since it has been essentially a domestic tax, easier to administer and 
collect. Similarly many developing countries collect tax through customs duties on 
imports at the border. Thus VAT/GST plus customs duties tend to comprise a 
significantly higher share of their revenues. With economic development, income 
taxes claim growing and higher shares. 
Thus, though on a purely conceptual basis, taxing both the income and 
expenditure sides of the macro-economic identity may be interpreted as taxing both 
supply and demand, nevertheless, in practice, it has not stopped tax authorities from 
imposing taxation on both. Thus what is conceptually clean may not always 
comprise the limits of the applied tax base. In the ultimate analysis, the practice of 
taxation reflects a combination of what is implemented with the intermittent 
incorporation, in the form of tax reform, of concepts developed through the 
progress of tax theory. Thus, it occurred that both income and expenditure were 
used as revenue bases as the tax instrument began to be applied increasingly widely.    
 
ii. DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION TAXES 
 
Value added tax (VAT) or goods and services tax (GST): The internationally 
accepted prevailing premise is that the best consumption tax from an efficiency 
point of view is a single or two-rated VAT or GST that credits all input taxes against 
all output taxes to be transferred to the exchequer. This obviously weeds out any 
embedding of prior-paid taxes in a product price, thus avoiding cascading or “tax 
on tax”. The philosophy of a VAT could be viewed as preferring a simple structure 
                                                      
15 Thus, Uruguay decided to replace its income tax altogether with a broad-based VAT. Indeed, many Latin 
American countries, for their stage of growth, have faced challenges to levy and collect from an ample 
income tax.  
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with a single or few rates that are charged directly at production and distribution 
points16. 
Nevertheless, there is a lingering issue with this for, reflecting the theory of 
“optimal taxation”, in order to eliminate economic distortions and “deadweight 
loss” associated with commodity taxation, the tax rate for every commodity should 
be ideally distinguished from another, pegging it at the inverse of its elasticity of 
demand. To explain simply, an inelastic good whose demand changes little with 
price movements can bear a higher tax rate since its demand would not change 
much with a rate increase in its tax (a price); hence the deadweight loss associated 
with the tax change would be lower. Zee17 analyses the associated algorithms. 
Contrary is the case with an elastic commodity whose tax rate should therefore be 
lower.  
In the amalgam of “indirect tax” theory, the VAT seems to have won out 
perhaps reflecting its easier collection mechanism using the debit-credit principle 
applied using output and input invoices. This is despite the fact that there is no 
country that has only one or two VAT rates; they have many rates that vary 
according to the type of product or product use. Indeed many countries have books 
full of VAT rates. India’s new GST introduced on July 1, 2017, suffers similarly 
from a large number of rates. It is a fiscal federal VAT comprising both the central 
and state governments. At the level of states, it earlier had a VAT that had lower 
rates for capital goods—presumed inputs—even though the VAT paid on them 
would be credited out anyway. The same structure continues in the new GST. 
The VAT base is usually diminished by exemptions (where output is not taxed 
so that input tax credit is not given); or zero rating (where output is not taxed, 
nevertheless input tax credit is given), and so on. VAT has also developed complex 
administration mechanisms such as reverse charge, presumptive taxation such as on 
cross-border reinsurance services, interpretation between goods and services for 
composite products such as set-top boxes to name just a few. 
Reflecting this experience with the VAT that has had to deal with a 
considerable degree of complexity, it is difficult to surmise why the tenets of optimal 
taxation following the inverse elasticity rule unabashedly lost out to the VAT. One 
explanation could be that a tax reflecting inverse elasticity of demand could lead to 
more inequity than the VAT if it were true that goods consumed by the less well-
off are more inelastic since their consumers cannot easily alter their meagre 
consumption baskets which, in turn, would imply higher tax rates as per optimum 
taxation rules. Whereas, as we move towards luxury goods, the elasticity of demand 
would tend to increase, and thus the tax rate would decrease. However, Atkinson 
and Stiglitz have shown that it is not impossible to build in an equity component in 
an optimal tax system. And it is not as though the VAT in general is far more 
equitable for it is well known that a VAT, being a consumption tax that exempts 
                                                      
16 Shome. 2014. Section IV. 
17 Zee, Howell H. 1995. “Tax Cascading: Concept and Measurement,” in P. Shome ed., Tax Policy Handbook, 
at III. International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C. 
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savings, is bound to be somewhat inequitable as well. Thus the resounding victory 
of the VAT as widely practised over optimal taxes remains a bit of a mystery. 
One thing is clear. Excise taxes are revenue productive. Excises on turnover 
are obviously revenue productive. They feature in most country annual budgets as 
discretionary measures for revenue. But the VAT too is depended on for revenue. 
In fact, a measure of the VAT’s revenue productivity was observed in Latin America 
by this author and it has been referred to as the Shome VAT productivity index18. 
If the general VAT rate is X%, then if it is designed well, it should be able to yield 
½ X% of GDP in revenue. Chile and New Zealand both had an 18% VAT rate and 
collected approximately 9% of their GDP in VAT revenue on a secular basis during 
the 1990’s. Most countries achieve 1/3X% of GDP or above without touching ½ 
X%. Countries that linger below 1/3X% comprise examples of poor VAT 
performance. In the UK, with a 17.5% VAT rate, VAT revenue hovers near 1/3 
X% (or 6%) of GDP. The open secret of achieving high VAT revenue productivity 
is to structure the VAT in such a way that most commodities are at the general rate, 
there are not too many lower rates, exemptions are few, zero rated items are few—
so that most goods and services are covered under the VAT—and tax 
administration is reliable so that VAT compliance is good and, last but not least, the 
taxpayer base is ample and can be steadily expanded.    
VAT rates are supposed to be few. However, there is the prevalence of demerit 
goods such as tobacco and alcohol for domestic consumption, luxuries such as furs 
and yachts, and non-renewable resources such as the array or petroleum products 
and aviation fuel that, by convention, are accepted to be subjected to higher rates 
of indirect taxation than the VAT rate. Thus, countries usually apply excises 
selectively on the turnover of alcoholic products, yachts and furs, and petroleum 
products on top of including them in the VAT base. This has the advantage of 
retaining information on their input use and input costs as in the case of all VAT-
able products. The reality is that most countries have a higher number of 
commodities on which they impose VAT plus excises. The appropriate excise rate 
structure has moved around somewhat with little economic rationale. When they 
were mainly “specific” rates or taxed by quantity of output, it was felt for decades 
that they should be taxed on an “ad valorem” basis in order for the value of excise 
revenue not to suffer from inflation. When country after country moved 
accordingly, tax administrators mainly from multilateral organisations began to push 
for specific rates with ease of administration as the objective.  
Environmental taxes and user charges: These taxes and charges also fall in 
this broad category. The former, termed “Pigouvian taxes”, apply for environmental 
objectives19. The idea is to impose a tax that would redress environmental damage, 
                                                      
18 Modi, Arbind. 2009. Report of the Task Force on Goods and Services Tax, Thirteenth Finance 
Commission, Government of India, 15th December, New Delhi. In a subcommittee report on the 
introduction of a GST in India on a revenue neutral basis with respect to taxes that would be abolished, 
Modi addresses it. 
19 Pigou, A.C. 1932. The Economics of Welfare, 4th Edition. Macmillan and Co., London. 
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or ‘internalise’ the negative ‘external’ effects of the activity. This would rightly bring 
up the private costs of an economic activity thus helping bring the private cost of 
the activity to equate the social cost it causes. Thus such taxes could be used to 
reduce pollution by earmarking the revenue for cleaning up the environment. The 
European Union has moved significantly forward in environmental tax design while 
the United States has walked away from an international agreement on environment 
termed the Paris Agreement. The matter of a global carbon tax has also re-emerged 
in the context of the G-20’s development agenda though it has not taken hold. 
In matters of road maintenance and the provision of selected public services, 
charging users according to the extent of use has proved to be efficient—the benefit 
principle—for example in Singapore. Common concerns include methods to 
adequately identify the user, measure the intensity of use, safeguard fairness, and 
develop a correct table of user charges. 
 
iii. INCOME AND WEALTH TAXES 
 
The definition of income during a period reflects development of the Schanz-Haig-
Simons comprehensive income concept20. It is the sum of the market value of rights 
exercised in consumption and the change in the value of property rights between 
the beginning and end of the period in question. Most countries fail to adhere to it. 
In practice, features that determine tax liability include the specification of taxable 
unit, taxable income or sources of income subject to tax, the tax schedule and tax 
preferences. The number of brackets, the treatment of particular types of income 
for example the taxability, or not, of second or more real property, allowable 
deductions, exemptions, tax credit, tax sparing, formulae to mitigate the effects of 
inflation, further embellish and differ across tax systems.  
In this mix, tax economists search for rationale for the income tax structure. 
They test the post-tax distribution of income across income deciles against pre-tax 
incomes; they check the corporation income tax’s “long run” ramification for capital 
returns and, thus, on capital accumulation; they conduct experiments on the 
realisation of government’s objective to maximise social welfare using the income 
tax and, at the same time, the efficiency costs of the income tax on individual work 
effort, and root for such normative characteristics to get reflected in the tax design. 
Musgrave, Harberger, Krzyzaniak, and Mieszkowski conducted the seminal works.21 
                                                      
20 The inclusion of net wealth in the tax base lends the phrase ‘comprehensive’ to the definition. Simon, 
Henry Calvert. 1938. Personal Income Taxation: The Definition of Income as a Problem of Fiscal Policy, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
21 Musgrave, RA. 1953. ‘General Equilibrium Aspects of Incidence Theory’, American Economic Review, Vol 
43, pp 504-17; Harberger, Arnold C. 1962. ‘The Incidence of the Corporate Income Tax’, Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol 46, pp 75-85; Krzyzaniak, Marian. 1967. ‘The Long-Run Burden of General Tax on Profits in 
a Neo-classical World’, Public Finance/Finances Publiques, Vol 22, No. 4, pp 472-91; Mieszkowski, PM. 1967. 
‘On the Theory of Tax Incidence’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol 75, pp 250-62. Others who followed 
included Shome, Parthasarathi. 1978. ‘The Incidence of the Corporation Tax in India: A General 
Equilibrium Analysis’, Oxford Economic Papers, Vol 30 (1), pp 64-73, reproduced in Shome. 2014. Section 
II.1; Shome, Parthasarathi. 1981. ‘The General Equilibrium Model Theory and Concepts of Tax Incidence 
in the Presence of Third or More Factors’, Public Finance, Vol 36(1), pp 22-38, reproduced in Shome. 2014. 
Section II.3; Shoven, John B, and John Whalley. 1972. ‘A General Equilibrium Calculation of the Effects 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3199902 
 
                11/2018 
 
 10 
Nevertheless cross-country variation in income tax structure is significant, 
beginning from whether the individual income tax should have a global base or a 
country specific—scheduler—rate structure; and whether the corporate income tax 
should be based in the source country of income, or based on the residence country 
of the capital whose income is being taxed. This reflects fundamental and continuing 
differences across modern economies, and within the same economy over time, in 
their perceptions of fairness, adverse efficiency costs and, finally, on what the role 
of government should be in society and how much financing it would need for that 
role.  
Design issues: While progressivity is generally accepted as a favourable 
feature to achieve equity, its definition varies. Thus, one measure, focusing on the 
distribution of taxes, could yield high progressivity as long as all taxes fall on a few, 
say the richest decile of taxpayers, even if the overall tax burden is low, say 1 percent 
to 1.5 percent of GDP as was common in the 1990’s Latin America22. Another 
measure, focusing on after-tax distribution of income, may conclude that the same 
tax system reflects low progressivity. These differences assume great importance in 
prevalent income and wealth distribution patterns as wealth concentration across 
the globe narrows down on a few individuals. 
While taxing comprehensive income may be the goal, its determination 
remains complex. For a business or corporation, the correct valuation of assets and 
liabilities through appropriate adjustment for inflation, income on accrual or cash 
basis, the length of time for which a loss may be carried forward or backward—so 
that risk taking firms are not overly penalised compared to risk averse firms—
depreciation rules—straight line, declining balance, accelerated depreciation—
inventory valuation—last in first out, first in first out, period average methods—or 
treatment of foreign currency assets with changing exchange rates, are but a few 
elements that comprise challenges for the taxpayer that, unless carefully interpreted 
and calculated, could lead to litigation with the tax authorities. 
Integration of dividend income in individual and corporate income tax23: 
More than a design issue, this is a conceptual area that has not yet been resolved. 
Dividends are a source of income that are taxed at the corporate level prior to 
distribution and then again after distribution as income in the hands of individuals. 
The case against this “double taxation” is that corporations have no independent 
ability to pay and are simply a pass-through for incomes to individuals. Conceptually 
this could be perceived in similar fashion to the collection of VAT through different 
stages of production and distribution; yet it is only the final consumer who 
                                                      
of Differential Taxation of Income from Capital in the US,’ Journal of Public Economics, pp 281-321; and 
several others.  
22 Shome. 2014. Sections I.5 and VI.3. 
23 Various authors have considered the details of the practices and the ideal direct tax structure in Shome 
ed. 1995. Tax Policy Handbook, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., reproduced in Shome. 
2014. Section V.3, a treatise that is in permanent use in various ministries of finance and tax administrations 
for reference and training. 
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ultimately pays the entire tax, while the previous stages become merely collection 
points. In this sense the VAT is equivalent to a retail sales tax.  
Yet there has been reticence on the part of adherents to the classical tax system 
to view corporations as conduits. Apprehension of revenue loss is a big reason for 
lack of full integration in classical systems such as India, the UK and the US. In any 
event, countries give at least partial tax relief at either the individual or corporate 
level. In India, for example, dividends are taxed through a dividend distribution tax 
(DDT) at a significantly lower rate prior to distribution by the corporate entity. 
Reflecting foreign tax credit issues, MNE’s do not pay DDT but their corporate tax 
rate is higher than that of domestic companies.  
Integration possesses another benefit. Interest payments are deductible by 
corporations (though ceilings may be worked into the tax structure to minimise thin 
capitalisation). However, dividend pay-out may not reduce the calculation of taxable 
profit. If so, the corporate tax structure would have a bias in favour of debt 
financing. A view does exist, however, that this favourable debt bias becomes less 
effective if profits are reinvested and the realisation of capital gains and, in turn, its 
taxation, are indefinitely postponed. In the final analysis, an easy approach to treat 
debt and equity financing in a neutral way is integration. 
Taxation of capital gains: Ideally, capital gains on real property and financial 
assets should be taxed under comprehensive income. However due to both fear of 
adverse impact on investment as well as challenges of measuring accrued capital 
gains, governments tend to interpret capital gains as differently motivated. Thus 
they may be subject to lower tax rates or even exempted for finite periods. 
Differential taxation is also rationalised by viewing taxable income as a flow from 
capital sources, distinct from any changes to the value of those sources. When the 
tax schedule for capital gains is quite different from that of income, then the 
interpretation between income and capital gains assumes importance. Thus, if 
money made through exchange gains is not taxed until realised, should it be ordinary 
income or capital gains for tax purposes? Or if the capital is held for a randomly 
defined “short” or “long” term, should the tax rate differ—as in India?  
Cash-flow tax: The corporate income tax has been criticised in that, for all its 
complexity in design, in practice it is not a tax on income as such but, rather, on 
some hybrid base that is residual of various exemptions and deductions, many of 
which are likely to be ad hoc. Therefore, some tax economists have recommended 
a simpler tax base that would approximate the cash-flow of a company. Despite the 
search for simplicity, immediately three variants of a cash-flow tax on corporations 
(CCFT) appeared, reflecting on a variety of interpretations of cash-flow itself. 
The first variant is the R—or real—base CCFT in which the tax base is net real 
transactions (the difference between sales and purchases of real goods and services). 
As opposed to a corporate income tax (CIT), the RCCFT would allow immediate 
expensing of capital outlays but not the usual deduction for interest payments. 
Interest received would not be taxable either.  
The second variant is the RF—or real plus financial—base CCFT that, in 
addition, includes in its tax base non-equity financial transactions (the difference 
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between borrowing and lending). Interest and retirement of debt would be 
deductible, while borrowing and interest received would be taxable.  
The third variant is the S—or shareholder—base CCFT, which would tax the 
net flow from the corporation to shareholders (dividends paid plus purchases of 
shares minus the issue of new shares); it would conform closely to the interpretation 
that the CCFT is a ‘silent partnership’ of the government in any investment. 
The CCFT’s advantages are primarily in the ease of practice and clarity of the 
tax base insofar as it does away with the problems of defining true economic 
depreciation, measuring capital gains, costing inventories, and accounting for 
inflation (although not in all variants of the tax). However, the CCFT suffers from 
possible tax avoidance and evasion that could be contained somewhat by selecting 
the more comprehensive RF-base over the R-base, thereby ensuring the inclusion 
of the financial sector in the tax base. On the other hand, an important advantage 
of the R-base, not shared by the RF-base, is non-deductibility of interest which 
eliminates incentives for debt over equity financing and obviates any need for 
inflation adjustment for the calculation of real interest. The S-base might be 
administratively simple but could result in a prohibitive tax rate reflecting its overtly 
narrow base.  
Thus the choice among the three CCFT bases is challenging to make despite 
international discussions appearing from time to time over the matter. In particular, 
international considerations turn out to be important in any future implementation 
of CCFT because of unresolved treatment of foreign tax credit under a CCFT. To 
this author, the CCFT remains a theoretically attractive concept with accompanying 
practical difficulties whose time has not come in particular in the context of already 
existing concerns of tax base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS).24 
Presumptive taxes: Philosophically, perhaps presumption is not a superior 
concept on which to base taxation; nevertheless presumptive taxes are 
administrative devices that are widely used for practical purposes in particular in 
developing countries. For example, under the VAT, often there is a generally applied 
presumptive taxation scheme—compounding—in which a threshold is defined 
below which a taxpayer is given the option not to have to maintain invoices and, 
instead, to pay tax at a low rate on a turnover base. It is not surprising that, usually, 
a concentration of taxpayers is found just below the threshold. A Latin American 
finance minister once lamented to this author that, “Doctor, in my country, there 
are many elephants hidden among the mice.”25 
Arguments in favour of presumptive taxation are many including, for example, 
in the above case, the likelihood of losing potential taxpayers if strict VAT rules 
were applied to them. While the revenue per small taxpayer may not be high, there 
can be spillover effects that move them from the unorganised to the organised 
                                                      
24 For further elaboration, see Shome, Parthasarathi and Schutte, Christian. 1993. “Cash-Flow Tax, Staff 
Papers, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp 638-662, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C., reconsidered in 
Shome. 2014. Section V.3. 
25 ‘Doctor’ is a term used by many Latin Americans to convey a presumed learnedness.  
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sector while protecting them from extortive tax officers. The cost of tax 
administration in terms of audit time is also reduced. 
Presumptive structures could also be devised under the income tax, for 
example, requiring small taxpayers to submit certain annual figures of available input 
use such as electricity, cement or petroleum, based on which the tax administration 
could assess their net income by applying cost to profit ratios. However, the use of 
punitive presumptive tax rates to push small taxpayers into the general tax structure 
and regulations may backfire by causing taxpayers to recede underground.  
Minimum income tax: A minimum tax could be perceived as an example or 
variant of presumptive taxation. The purpose of a minimum tax is to ensure that 
businesses or individuals with economic income do not regularly avoid paying tax 
on it. It becomes a method of generating revenue when a tax administration wants 
to ensure that all taxpayers pay at least a minimum even if they qualify for tax 
incentives that would reduce their tax liability to very low levels. It thus requires 
taxpayers to make minimum contributions to selected taxes. A minimum tax on 
business should reduce the inequity in income tax that could also arise due to 
differences in tax compliance across businesses.  Political clout of large businesses 
to reduce tax impact on them is also contained. And, in an inflationary environment, 
gains made by debt-financed firms in reducing tax liability, are checked.  
Forms of minimum taxes vary. Using turnover as the base provides certain 
advantages since turnover is the most easily measured financial variable for a 
business and most easily available to tax authorities. An assets based minimum tax 
has a theoretical appeal in that economic income could be expected to bear a 
systematic relationship to assets. It has to be designed carefully, however. One 
possibility is for its base to be gross business assets including cash and securities, 
receivables, inventories, land and other fixed assets at depreciated value, and 
intangible assets at amortised value. It is also possible to impose the tax on fixed 
assets—land, plant and equipment—but this discriminates against particular asset 
forms. Alternatively, it could be on net assets—gross assets net of debt-financed 
liabilities—but this does not remove the incentive to reduce the tax base through 
increased borrowing. 
A gross assets based minimum tax has been used in Argentina, Ecuador, 
Mexico and Peru while India’s minimum tax is book profits—variously defined over 
the years—based. Canada, Denmark, Norway and the US have minimum taxes 
based on a broader concept of income—with less deductions—for selected sectors 
with high capital use. Morocco has used a minimum tax based on turnover. 
Mexico’s minimum tax had a rate of 2 percent based on gross assets. The assets 
tax liability was designed to be roughly equivalent to a taxpayer’s potential income 
tax liability. If the taxpayer is assumed to earn a 6 percent return on assets and the 
business income tax rate is 33 percent, then a 2 percent tax on assets is roughly 
equivalent. Taxpayers may credit their income tax liability against their assets tax 
liability. 
In the US, tax is calculated on a redefined notion of business income. It is 
essentially computed by adding back certain tax preference items to income. 
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Affected businesses—largely in exploration activities—are required to compute tax 
liabilities under the regular and alternative systems and pay the higher of the two. 
India has a minimum alternate tax (MAT) based on book profits whose 
definition over the years has been amplified to make the tax base broader, and 
whose rate has also been increased. Interestingly the rate has moved up in 
consonance with the effective corporate income tax rate. Currently the MAT rate is 
18.5 percent. And the MAT base now covers Special Economic Zones (SEZs) that 
otherwise receive profit linked incentives. Earlier attempts to move away from a 
book profits base to a gross assets base did not materialise. Even the current MAT 
is constantly under attack by companies. 
Selected additional aspects of the contour of taxation such as the taxation of 
non-replaceable mineral resources, of the financial sector, fiscal federal 
considerations where different levels of government have separate taxing powers 
and revenue sharing responsibilities, and the entire area of how tax administrations 
in modern times continue to suffer from overreach on good taxpayers to the extent 
of impinging on investment and economic growth, can also be important. 
Essentially, emerging issues in income and related taxation remain ever-new and 
expanding. What emerges, as was hypothesised at the beginning, was its variety if 
not non-conformity. What may be perceived as conventional in one economy is 
perceived as distortionary or inequitable, and the dialogue continues. Sometimes 
even dialogue is truncated. The point to ponder is, what is, or what remains of, tax 
reform.    
International taxation—advanced versus emerging economies: This area 
is by and large eschewed by tax economists—though there is no particular 
explanation as to why—and has fallen in the competence area of lawyers, 
accountants and administrators26. This is an area that is widely termed international 
taxation. One possible answer why tax economists, by and large, have not ventured 
into this area may lie in their derision to read reams of legal paper. Nevertheless it 
has become increasingly important that all tax professionals become familiar with 
the issues being addressed in this field27. 
The Group of 20 Nations (G20) asked the Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) to suggest comprehensive measures to 
address egregious tax avoidance by multinational enterprises (MNEs) that are 
believed to structure their business arrangements through a process of tax base 
erosion by shifting profits (BEPS) among their parent companies, branches and 
subsidiaries across national boundaries. Essentially they locate profits in low tax 
jurisdictions and successfully minimise their total tax contribution in terms of their 
global profits. Though such operations are likely to be legal, advanced country tax 
administrations began to perceive such practices as unreflective of the intention of 
                                                      
26 Shome, Parthasarathi ed. 2016. Insights into Evolving Issues of Taxation: Existing and Continuing Challenges, 
International Tax Research and Analysis Foundation (ITRAF), Wolters Kluwer, New Delhi. 
27 Rohtagi, Roy. 2005. Basic International Taxation: Principles, Vol. I, Richmond Law & Tax. 
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the law as the 2008 global financial, turned economic, crisis hit them hard in terms 
of significantly lower than trend revenue from the corporate income tax28.  
When the BEPS steering group was formed, the OECD invited Brazil and 
India to participate thus moving away, for this purpose, from operating as a cluster 
of advanced economies. Even a decade back India had looked askance from the 
OECD as a rich country club and it required considerable effort to get India to 
participate in selected OECD deliberations. A short while before this, India's 
posture on international taxation had been strongly and publicly criticised by tax 
authorities of advanced economies in particular the US, compelling India to modify 
its position. In the end, by all accounts, India's role in BEPS turned out to be 
comprehensive as it made useful contributions to the 15 BEPS reports. 
India, and several emerging economies, had steadfastly argued well before 
BEPS that tax revenue must justly accrue in source jurisdictions where value added 
was created in the international supply chain of a commodity or service. Advanced 
economies by and large ignored this stance, their position being, revenue should 
accrue where risk taking and management decisions were made and where capital 
resided. However, with the collapse in advanced economy revenue with the onset 
of the 2008 global crisis, they began to realise the potential revenue benefits of 
applying the source principle as India did. Recognising the validity of India's 
position, advanced economies pointed out, their disagreement lay less in India's 
philosophical stance than in the unpredictable implementation of Indian tax laws 
pertaining to international taxation as well as its practice of retrospective legislation 
that changed risk parameters of businesses ex-post. 
Examining the array of BEPS recommendations, one may assess that there are 
good possibilities that they will be of benefit to India and other emerging economies. 
For example, Action 5 of BEPS highlights the so-called substance test, linking the 
accrual of intellectual property (IP) rights and associated income and the right of 
taxation thereof to where research and development (R&D) take place, making 
jurisdictional taxability a more transparent phenomenon than before. This supports 
India's viewpoint to the extent that India is host to R&D of MNEs. To achieve 
transparency, BEPS solidly fortifies exchange of information among tax 
administrations and raises it to a high pedestal, a matter that has also been pushed 
for by India while advanced economies have been historically reticent about it. At 
the same time, the OECD tends to neutralise its position inasmuch as BEPS Actions 
8 to 10 go deeper into the relationship between risk taking and intangibles such as 
intellectual property (IP) to ensure that they are not dissociated from revenue 
rewards, thus tilting towards a position in favour of advanced economies. 
Another concern where the Indian view has been vindicated is BEPS Action 6 
on limiting treaty abuse and controlling treaty shopping by specifying a principal 
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Financial Crisis,” in Deepak Mohanty ed. Monetary Policy, Sovereign Debt and Financial Stability: The 
New Trilemma, Cambridge University Press, India. 
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purpose test for an MNE operation in a taxing jurisdiction29. This should assist India 
and emerging economies to receive a more rightful share of global MNE revenue. 
Nevertheless there were limits to what India and emerging economies could achieve. 
BEPS Action 1 could be safely viewed as not having fully achieved adequacy in the 
taxation of the digital economy, a matter that has remained of some concern to 
India where the digital economy has made a strong presence while escaping taxation 
and leading to intractable disputes. The BEPS' superficial assertion that already 
agreed upon taxation arrangements specified in the double taxation avoidance 
agreements (DTAAs) should be adhered to, limits the ability to tax the digital 
economy since most DTAAs did not anticipate and do not address this issue. It also 
reveals the continuation of strong influences of advanced economies in what 
position the OECD may finally take. Clearly the emerging problem of taxing 
bitcoins needs to be quickly guided lest an increasing number of countries begins to 
tax it unilaterally as is already beginning to occur.  
MNEs have been productive in technology, in production and supply, and in 
raising living standards globally. Their tax performance should be segmented into 
good and bad performers. There are likely to be good taxpayers even among those 
who fall above the high threshold that BEPS Action 13 has stipulated for the 
detailed 3-step—master file, country-by-country (CbC), local—reporting of their 
global operations. The authorities' expectation is that CbC coupled with information 
exchange would reduce disputes. Nevertheless, the importance of Advance Pricing 
Arrangements (APAs) whose speed has albeit been slow, cannot be minimised. A 
heavy-handed reporting system applied to all MNEs indiscriminately is detrimental 
to global productivity and growth. It is expectable that Action 13 would be scaled 
back in future deliberations reflecting that collapse in global growth was the 
motivator for the G20's BEPS initiative while revenue decline was only its offshoot. 
Ultimately, revenue at the cost of growth is unlikely to receive sympathetic ears from 
global policymakers, for lower growth would affect even revenue in the medium 
term. 
 
 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
To conclude, the tax economist tends to view the theoretical underpinnings of 
taxation as the final analysis of taxation. They consider how the tatonnement process 
of price determination is vitiated by tax interventions which comprise many a form 
of price distortion; or how movement away from an equilibrium state by a factor of 
production must ensue when a partial tax is imposed on it. The corporation income 
tax is a manifestation of the latter which is levied only on capital use in the corporate 
                                                      
29 Roxan. 2002; and Shome, Parthasarathi. 2012. Expert Committee on General Anti-Avoidance Rules 
(GAAR), Government of India, New Delhi. 
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sector and not on the non-corporate sector. And, at the end of such movements, 
the relative incomes of all factors of production—capital, labour, land—must 
equilibrate. No doubt these are important matters of investigation for they point to 
the direction of say, whether capital owners ultimately bear the corporate income 
tax or pass on the “incidence”—tax burden—to labour and/or land; or whether, as 
has been tracked, there is rapid flight of capital which is an extremely mobile factor 
of production.  
What we saw in our discussion was that the ramifications of taxation do not 
end there. The ultimate incidence of taxation reflects all such aspects that go far 
beyond narrow “economic” aspects even though such legal, accountancy or 
administrative aspects may be considered somewhat overbearing.  Nevertheless, the 
glass wall between tax economist and tax law or accountancy, and the glass wall 
between tax economist and tax administration must be removed with an awareness 
smoothly flowing from one to the other. Only then tax reform can be discussed on 
the same plane and implemented with comparable understandings. In an intricately 
inter-connected world of trade and investment and associated challenges of 
equitable revenue collection from productive enterprises and fair cross-country 
revenue distribution among nations, it is imperative for knowledge to break walls 
and cross boundaries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
